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20th anniversary of Pinochet's arrest in London, 16th October 1998
______________________________________________________________English version, below: https://andrewmcentee.blogspot.com/2018/10/english-trans-la-tercera-andy-mcentee.html
[English, longer version: https://andrewmcentee.blogspot.com/2018/10/english-version-interview-in-la-tercera.html ]
actor Peter Capaldi as human rights lawyer Andy McEntee
"Pinochet In Suburbia" [UK title] / "Pinochet's Last Stand" [USA title]
(BBC &; HBO, 2006)
"Pinochet In Suburbia" [UK title] / "Pinochet's Last Stand" [USA title]
(BBC &; HBO, 2006)
(duration: 0 mins, 49 secs)
Andy McEntee, the lawyer who was key to the arrest of Pinochet: “Frei had no interest in challenging the regime”
By: Alejandra Jara | 16 October 2018
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| Andy McEntee, Chairman of Amnesty International UK (High Court, London, 27 January 2000) |
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There is an episode that marked the life and career of the renowned Human Rights lawyer Andrew McEntee: it occurred on the 11th of December 1998, and is intimately related to the history of the Chilean transition. That day McEntee -at the time Chairman of Amnesty International UK- was a witness to the moment when Augusto Pinochet Ugarte for the first time came face to face with the forces of justice in Belmarsh Court, south London, where he was committed for trial in the extradition proceedings against him.
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| 11th of December 1998 Augusto Pinochet Ugarte in the dock at Belmarsh Court |
~ In 1998 you were Chairman of Amnesty International UK. What was your opinion of the Chilean transition?
I had a good understanding of Chile’s so-called ‘transition’ to democracy, or, as I saw it, the ‘continuation’ that the regime was trying to assure through: a 1980 Constitution that still lacked the reforms necessary for a democratic system; an unreformable Congress that guaranteed a majority number of seats favouring ‘continuation’; a weak civilian court system, led by timid judges; impunity for crimes against humanity - including the continuing silence of state institutions about the fate and whereabouts of the ‘disappeared’; and an Army that remained under the command of General Pinochet until March of 1998 - without neglecting to mention that Pinochet appointed his own successor as Army commander in 1998, outside of the control of the civilian President of Chile. These are just a few of the available headlines for reflecting the problems of the ‘transition’ before the arrest of Pinochet in London.
In 1998 it was well known that former President Aylwin and incumbent President Frei had benefited plenty from Pinochet’s military coup, that both had applauded in 1973. Comfortable at finally having become Presidents, both of their governments proceeded with timidity in the face of the ‘continuity’ of the regime - a ‘state within the state’ that was underpinned by the Army and other regime actors, in Congress and other places.
This could be seen by the way that Frei’s government responded after Pinochet’s arrest. Chile protested to Spain and the UK, asserting to the world that Pinochet was a victim, because he had a ‘diplomatic passport’ - but without any evidence, and without any active diplomatic function - that guaranteed him immunity during his ‘special mission’ to London. And all while neither the Chilean embassy in London, nor the UK Foreign Office, knew anything about Pinochet’s visit, effectively a private journey. Also, Frei’s government came across as absurd by shouting to all the world that Pinochet’s arrest could endanger the road to democracy in Chile due to his absence.
~ How did you know that Pinochet was visiting London to undergo surgery?
Beginning with Pinochet’s first visit to England in 1991, I always received phone calls to tell me that Pinochet was about to leave Chile, or had arrived already in London, repeating in 1994, 1995 and 1997. Pinochet finished being head of the Army in March 1998, so his visit to Europe in September for surgery was a ‘private’ visit.
Once it was confirmed that Pinochet was in London for a medical procedure, his exact location was confirmed by the Chilean community in London, on the morning of 9th October. It was presumed that he would be hiding behind a false name, but eventually ‘Ugarte’ was identified at the London Clinic.
My priority was to prepare the legal case, documents and procedures, and then line up a team of British lawyers willing to spend time assisting me and Amnesty, without payment of course. If a judge was willing to issue an order for the arrest of Pinochet, then the police would take action immediately, without the need for me or anyone else to tell them where to find him. All the stuff about finding him, getting him on camera, protesting outside his window, is very important in a democratic society, but was largely irrelevant for my work. Mostly I needed to know that this time he would not be flying out of England before the courts and police could be mobilised.
~ In the book “Pinochet, 503 days trapped in London”, by Chilean journalist Mónica Pérez, it is revealed that you advised the Spanish lawyer Joan Garcés how to get going the measures that could permit the capture of Pinochet. What do you remember about your conversation?
On Saturday 10th October 1998, I learned that Pinochet currently was in the London Clinic. It was through a phone call from Vicente Alegría, one of the members of the Chilean Human Rights Commission of London. At the same time, Jimmy Bell of the Commission was calling to inform Joan Garcés in Madrid, the lawyer representing many Chilean victims, who was in touch with the two judges investigating Pinochet in separate complaints - judges Manuel García-Castellón and Baltasar Garzón. Vicente and Jimmy recommended that I call Joan Garcés to discuss the case, as Garcés had been waiting for news of something happening in London; specifically hoping for news of an arrest.
I called Joan Garcés at home, while he was quietly enjoying a Spanish long-weekend; the coming Monday would be a public holiday in Spain, so the courts and law firms would be closed, at a time when the pace of legal intervention should be speeding up. We spoke in Spanish and English, jumping back and forth in each's mother tongue. I remember him asking me, "Can you have Pinochet arrested in London, by a judge, for genocide?” My short answer was “No.” In our conversation we discussed the relevant British laws and procedures, principally in terms of what I had tried already, what had worked and what had not worked, and why or why not.
After a while, our conversation drew to a close. Joan said he would go consult with colleagues about our discussion. On the following day, Sunday mid-afternoon, Joan called me at home. He had some questions arising from our previous discussion, and wanted to push the genocide issue again. So we had another long conversation about genocide, torture, judges’ powers, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1997. Eventually we bade farewell again, satisfied with the scope and direction of our discussions. Joan’s final words to me were, "Andy, we're going to do what we can. We're working on it."
From the beginning it was clear that the efforts of the Chilean government to extradite Pinochet from London were a politico-theatrical manoeuvre, not desiring his return at all, but intended to placate Pinochet’s supporters. Chile’s English lawyer had merely turned up in the London court to argue that Chile had the superior right to extradite, not Spain, but without Chile actually having filed for extradition. It was not a serious attempt to secure Pinochet’s transfer to Santiago under arrest, as a prisoner.
There was no way that Chile could uphold the international requirements for extradition of Pinochet. From the moment that Pinochet landed in Santiago, the military would intervene over the head of the civil justice system. The Chilean court system was still weak in 1998, almost colonial, not only because most of the senior judges had been appointed during the Pinochet regime, but also they knew everything about the human rights abuses, and were too scared to investigate (He clarifies that judge René García Villegas was an exception).
I had met Eduardo Frei around ten years earlier, during his visit to London organised by the British Foreign Office. Frei came to my office for a discussion about the current role of his party, the DC, and his own vision for Chile. Andrés Allamand, of RN, also visited my office, and was a ball of fire and energy. Also, Roberto Lagos. But Frei was disinterested, detached, with little to say, seeming to confirm that he was a mere figurehead underpinned by his father's name, and with no interest in challenging the regime. By 1998, I could see that Frei, now President, had not changed much. Nobody in London believed that the Frei government's so-called extradition request was genuine.
~ What was the impact on Pinochet’s image of his arrest in London?
It is certain that Pinochet lost the battle for control of how he will be portrayed in Chile's history books. I knew it as soon as the High Court in London began reading out its list of hundreds of cases of torture, murder and enforced disappearance of men, women and children that he was responsible for. I saw that, by the time of his return to Chile in 2000, even the official school history textbook had been rewritten in his absence. Already children were learning about his responsibility for these crimes.
I also recall the absurd theatre of a powerful Chilean general trying to escape a meeting with an ordinary London judge by riding a wheelchair into the courtroom attached to Belmarsh Prison, and pleading to be allowed to go home after ordering his doctor to tell the judge that he is unwell and has lost his memory.
~ Pinochet finally returned to Chile and was never arrested for his connection to crimes against humanity.
It is regrettable that Chile was not strong enough actually to prosecute Pinochet and ALL of his collaborators for their crimes against humanity, and their embezzlement of millions of dollars into overseas bank accounts. Still, I note the large number of people who by now have been found guilty and sent to prison, even if usually for too few years.
An important part of the justice process is to establish the truth. The truth was widely known in Chile and internationally even before his arrest in London, even though it was being denied by Pinochet supporters in Chile.
By the time of Pinochet’s return to Chile he had suffered a string of defeats and humiliations, mostly brought about by his own bad judgment. For example, his bad judgment in ignoring the advice of his London lawyers year after year after 1991, believing he was above the law of civilised nations, until he visited London once too often.
By the time of Pinochet’s return to Chile in March 2000, the hundreds of human rights complaints filed in Chilean courts were well established. But of course the courts, the laws, the Constitution continued to be weak, and he continued to claim immunity, and ill-health so unfit for trial.
It was bad luck for Roberto Lagos that Pinochet returned to Santiago several days before Roberto assumed the presidency. But it was good that a momentum for change had set in already, that some welcome changes had indeed happened, and that President Lagos could bring about more reforms to the Constitution.
In 2018 I still receive the regular bulletins of FASIC that inform about human rights cases in Chile’s courts. In spite of many prosecutions and imprisonments, clearly the situation remains mixed and unstable. For example, the 2018 decision of three judges of the Supreme Court to release five regime criminals responsible for crimes against humanity at Punta Peuco, including the disappearance of Dr. Eduardo Gonzalez Galeno.
And of course President Piñera in 2018 displayed no shame in pardoning Col. René Cardemil, who murdered six citizens but received only a ten-year sentence.
The Pinochet legacy has to be rejected by the democratic civilian government, not embraced by it, and the agents and criminal methods of Pinochet have to remain marginalised by state institutions and leaders, not embraced by the Supreme Court and the President.
The lawyer and human rights activist closes the interview with slogans in Spanish: “No + porque somos +” [“No More, Because We Are More!”], and “¡Verdad Y Justicia!” ["Truth And Justice!"] adding. "…even in 2018... maybe, but maybe not yet."
The lawyer and human rights activist closes the interview with slogans in Spanish: “No + porque somos +” [“No More, Because We Are More!”], and “¡Verdad Y Justicia!” ["Truth And Justice!"] adding. "…even in 2018... maybe, but maybe not yet."
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